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CERT Advisory CA-2001-01 Interbase Server Contains Compiled-in Back Door
Account

   Original release date: January 10, 2001
   Last revised: --
   Source: CERT/CC

   A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

     * Borland/Inprise Interbase 4.x and 5.x
     * Open source Interbase 6.0 and 6.01
     * Open source Firebird 0.9-3 and earlier

Overview

   Interbase is an open source database package that had previously been
   distributed in a closed source fashion by Borland/Inprise. Both the
   open and closed source verisions of the Interbase server contain a
   compiled-in back door account with a known password.

I. Description

   Interbase is an open source database package that is distributed by
   Borland/Inprise at http://www.borland.com/interbase/ and on
   SourceForge. The Firebird Project, an alternate Interbase package, is
   also distributed on SourceForge. The Interbase server for both
   distributions contains a compiled-in back door account with a fixed,
   easily located plaintext password. The password and account are
   contained in source code and binaries previously made available at the
   following sites:

          http://www.borland.com/interbase/
          http://sourceforge.net/projects/interbase
          http://sourceforge.net/projects/firebird
          http://firebird.sourceforge.net
          http://www.ibphoenix.com
          http://www.interbase2000.com

   This back door allows any local user or remote user able to access
   port 3050/tcp [gds_db] to manipulate any database object on the
   system. This includes the ability to install trapdoors or other trojan
   horse software in the form of stored procedures. In addition, if the
   database software is running with root privileges, then any file on
   the server's file system can be overwritten, possibly leading to
   execution of arbitrary commands as root.

   This vulnerability was not introduced by unauthorized modifications to
   the original vendor's source. It was introduced by maintainers of the
   code within Borland. The back door account password cannot be changed
   using normal operational commands, nor can the account be deleted from
   existing vulnerable servers [see References].

   This vulnerability has been assigned the identifier CAN-2001-0008 by
   the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) group:

          http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0008

   The CERT/CC has not received reports of this back door being exploited
   at the current time. We do recommend, however, that all affected sites
   and redistributors of Interbase products or services follow the
   recommendations suggested in Section III, as soon as possible due to
   the seriousness of this issue.

II. Impact

   Any local user or remote user able to access port 3050/tcp [gds_db]
   can manipulate any database object on the system. This includes the
   ability to install trapdoors or other trojan horse software in the
   form of stored procedures. In addition, if the database software is
   running with root privileges, then any file on the server's file
   system can be overwritten, possibly leading to execution of arbitrary
   commands as root.

III. Solution

Apply a vendor-supplied patch

   Both Borland and The Firebird Project on SourceForge have published
   fixes for this problem. Appendix A contains information provided by
   vendors supplying these fixes. We will update the appendix as we
   receive more information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the
   CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor
   directly.

   Users who are more comfortable making their own changes in source code
   may find the new code available on SourceForge useful as well:

          http://sourceforge.net/projects/interbase
          http://sourceforge.net/projects/firebird

Block access to port 3050/tcp

   This will not, however, prevent local users or users within a
   firewall's adminstrative boundary from accessing the back door
   account. In addition, the port the Interbase server listens on may be
   changed dynamically at startup.

Appendix A. Vendor Information

Borland

   Please see:

          http://www.borland.com/interbase/

IBPhoenix

   The Firebird project uncovered serious security problems with
   InterBase. The problems are fixed in Firebird build 0.9.4 for all
   platforms. If you are running either InterBase V6 or Firebird 0.9.3,
   you should upgrade to Firebird 0.9.4.

   These security holes affect all version of InterBase shipped since
   1994, on all platforms.

   For those who can not upgrade, Jim Starkey developed a patch program
   that will correct the more serious problems in any version of
   InterBase on any platform. IBPhoenix chose to release the program
   without charge, given the nature of the problem and our relationship
   to the community.

   At the moment, name service is not set up to the machine that is
   hosting the patch, so you will have to use the IP number both for the
   initial contact and for the ftp download.

   To start, point your browser at

          http://firebird.ibphoenix.com/

Apple

   The referenced database package is not packaged with Mac OS X or Mac
   OS X Server.

Fujitsu

   Fujitsu's UXP/V operating system is not affected by this problem
   because we don't support the relevant database.

References

    1. VU#247371: Borland/Inprise Interbase SQL database server contains
       backdoor superuser account with known password CERT/CC,
       01/10/2001, https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/247371
     _________________________________________________________________

   Author: This document was written by Jeffrey S Havrilla. Feedback on
   this advisory is appreciated.
   ______________________________________________________________________

   This document is available from:
   http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-01.html
   ______________________________________________________________________

CERT/CC Contact Information

   Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
          Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
          Fax: +1 412-268-6989
          Postal address:
          CERT Coordination Center
          Software Engineering Institute
          Carnegie Mellon University
          Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
          U.S.A.

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   * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
   Patent and Trademark Office.
   ______________________________________________________________________

   NO WARRANTY
   Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
   Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
   Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
   implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
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     _________________________________________________________________

   Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information

   Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.

   Revision History
January 10, 2001:  Initial release

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